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In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Lawson, a case of 
first impression about a juror’s use of Wikipedia during 
deliberations. Had this case been decided in the 1950s, the 
juror’s contact with the extra-record material during 
deliberations would have given rise to a presumption of 
prejudice in favor of the party claiming he was denied a 
fair trial. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the United 
States Supreme Court seemed to eliminate that presumption 
and place the burden of proving prejudice on the party 
seeking a new trial. As a result, federal circuit courts today 
disagree as to when, if at all, the moving party should enjoy 
a presumption of prejudice in such cases. But every federal 
circuit court’s substantive analysis focuses on the nature 
and impact of the extra-record contact, regardless of 
whether the presumption applies. This common substantive 
analysis has been used in Internet-based misconduct cases 
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Practitioners who allege that the jury in their client’s trial has 
been prejudiced by coming into contact with electronic extra-
record material should know that the circuit split over the 
presumption of prejudice is no split at all and that a common 
analysis applies. Technology has made it easier for jurors to access 
electronic extra-record material during deliberations and thereby 
engage in misconduct worthy of a new trial. But these advances in 
technology are coming at a time when federal circuit courts remain 
split over how to approach jury misconduct. Since the 1980s and 
1990s, the federal courts have not applied a uniform approach to 
assessing unauthorized, potentially influential contact between the 
jury and extra-record material during deliberations. Some circuits 
approach this type of misconduct by presuming prejudice to the 
defendant, others utilize no such presumption, and still others will 
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presume prejudice only in certain cases.1  
In light of new and changing technologies, these various 
approaches to jury misconduct may need to adapt. The Fourth 
Circuit’s novel finding in United States v. Lawson suggests that a 
juror’s contact with Wikipedia is more prejudicial than contact 
with other types of offline material.2 However, despite the circuit 
split, three factors indicate the utility of a core analysis in cases of 
Wikipedia-based jury misconduct. This particular type of 
misconduct should not be subject to divergent analyses because of 
the overwhelming consistency among federal circuit courts in 
analyzing accusations of jury misconduct, the fact that these courts 
are employing the same analysis in the emerging Internet-based 
misconduct cases, and the fact that the only circuit court to address 
Wikipedia-based misconduct was ultimately unsure of how to 
approach the issue. Regardless of the labels different courts put on 
their approach to jury misconduct analysis and the uniqueness of 
the Internet and Wikipedia as sources of juror misconduct, the 
analysis is and will be the same in every circuit. 
 
I.  THE CAUSE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Over the course of almost six decades, beginning in 1954, the 
Supreme Court created and subsequently rejected a presumption of 
prejudice when a juror comes into contact with potentially 
influential, extra-record materials or persons during deliberations. 
Jurors can only consider the material and witnesses presented to 
them during the trial.3 A key component to jury trials is the ability 
of the court to insulate jurors from material beyond that 
purposefully presented to them at trial.4 If a juror does come into 
contact with anything beyond that offered at trial, unfair prejudice 
might arise.5  
1 See infra Part II. 
2 United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 650–51 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the court is “troubled by Wikipedia’s lack of reliability”). 
3 25 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 624.72[1], 
at 624–96 (3d ed. 2002). 
4 1 DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE  
§ 1.2 (2012). 
5 Id. 
                                                 
3
Fredrickson: Conformity in Confusion: Applying a Common Analysis to Wikipedia-
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013
22 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 9:1 
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Remmer v. United States, 
which established a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when 
jurors come into contact with potentially influential, extra-record 
material or persons.6 In Remmer, an unnamed person attempted to 
bribe a juror for a favorable verdict.7 After the juror reported this 
bribe and while the jury deliberated, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) investigated the bribe.8  
The Court, observing that any contact “with a juror during a 
trial about the matter pending” is presumptively prejudicial, held 
that the unduly impressive and potentially chilling effect of the FBI 
investigation might have prejudiced the jurors.9 To be certain, the 
Court instructed the trial court to determine the circumstances of 
the contact, its impact, and any resulting prejudice via a hearing.10 
At this hearing, the government may attempt to show that the 
contact was harmless; however, the Court noted that the 
government’s burden when rebutting the presumption is “heavy.”11 
Decades later, the Supreme Court decisions in Smith v. Phillips 
and United States v. Olano suggested a withdrawal from the strict 
presumption previously articulated in Remmer.12 In Phillips, a 
juror applied for a position with the District Attorney’s office 
prosecuting the case.13 The Supreme Court held that this contact, 
which tended to improperly impress upon the juror’s decisions 
regarding the case, required a Remmer hearing.14 More 
specifically, the Remmer approach to allegations of juror 
impartiality applied because the Court accepted that “‘the average 
man in [the juror’s] position would believe that the verdict of the 
6 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
7 Id. at 228. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 229. 
10 Id. at 230. 
11 Id. at 229. Typically, the government’s burden of showing harmless error 
is by a preponderance of the evidence, but Remmer and its progeny do not 
clarify. See United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Eli, 
718 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209 (1982). 
13 Phillips, 455 U.S. at 212 (quoting Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 
1371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
14 Id. at 230. 
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jury would directly affect the evaluation of his job application.’”15 
The Court maintained, however, that at this hearing “the 
defendant ha[d] the opportunity to prove actual bias” and that it 
was “‘the defendant’s right to demonstrate’” the alleged 
prejudice.16 These articulations suggest a theoretical tailoring of 
that undefined, “heavy” burden in Remmer. Now, suggested the 
Phillips Court, the defendant must prove or demonstrate the bias 
that was supposed to be presumed in his favor. That is, the 
defendant has the burden of persuasion. 
In Olano, the Supreme Court also appeared to move away from 
the strict presumption by emphasizing that the trial court’s inquiry 
into this type of jury misconduct can either be framed as a 
rebuttable presumption or as a specific analysis.17 In Olano, the 
improper contact was the presence of alternate jurors in the jury 
room during deliberations.18 Since defense counsel did not object 
to their presence, the undue influential capacity of the alternates 
was analyzed using plain error review.19 Under plain error review 
the burden of persuasion automatically attaches to the defendant, 
but the Court discussed arguendo how to analyze this intrusion 
under Remmer.20 The Court noted that “a presumption of prejudice 
as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate 
inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and 
thereby its verdict?”21 Some federal circuit courts agree that this 
newfound emphasis on the subject of the inquiry over framing 
dilutes the strength of the strict Remmer presumption.22 Still, 
because neither Phillips nor Olano expressly overturned Remmer, 
other circuits keep the burden on the government. 
 
15 Id. at 214. 
16 Id. at 215, 217 (quoting in part Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 
(1981)). 
17 Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642. 
18 Olano, 507 U.S. at 727. 
19 Id. at 725. 
20 Id. at 734, 737–38. 
21 Id. at 739. 
22 See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 643 (citing the cases that hold Olano constituted 
negative treatment of Remmer). 
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II.  THE THREE APPROACHES 
 
In response to the creation of and possible withdrawal from the 
presumption of prejudice, the federal circuit courts have developed 
three approaches to improper extra-record contact: (1) applying the 
Remmer presumption, (2) abandoning the Remmer presumption, 
and (3) determining whether or not to apply the Remmer 
presumption based on the severity of the contact. There is some 
debate over which category the Eighth and Ninth circuits fit into, 
but the remaining circuits’ approaches are clear. Each approach is 
carried out pursuant to an abuse of discretion review, as it is well-
settled law that upon investigating “whether and to what extent the 
conduct was prejudicial, the trial court has wide discretion.”23  
 
A.  Applying the Remmer Presumption: Second, Fourth, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
 
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits 
apply the Remmer presumption when analyzing jury misconduct.24 
The clearest statement of this continued adherence to Remmer can 
be found in the Eleventh Circuit. In United States v. Ronda, a case 
later distinguished on unrelated grounds and never overturned, the 
court held that the defendant only has “to show that the jury has 
been exposed to extrinsic evidence or extrinsic contacts[,]” and 
that “[o]nce the defendant establishes that such exposure in fact 
occurred, prejudice is presumed . . . .”25 Upon a mere showing of 
inappropriate extra-record contact, courts in the Eleventh Circuit 
will shift the burden to the government to prove that the contact 
was not prejudicial.26 The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth 
23 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW § 12.06 (4th ed. 2010). 
24 See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644 (noting that Remmer has “continued 
vitality”); United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 828 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
the Remmer presumption is still good law); United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 
1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“It is well-settled that any extra-record information of which the juror 
becomes aware is presumed prejudicial.”); United States v. Aguirre, 108 F.3d 
1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 1997). 
25 Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1299. 
26 Id. 
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circuits have endorsed the same approach and presume prejudice in 
favor of the potentially disadvantaged moving party.27 
B.  Abandoning the Remmer Presumption: Fifth,  
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits 
 
The circuits maintaining the second approach—no presumption 
at all—are the Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. circuits.28 The Sixth Circuit in 
particular started to move away from the Remmer presumption the 
year after Phillips was decided, which was almost a decade before 
Olano reinforced the Phillips holding. In United States v. Pennell, 
the Sixth Circuit held that “[i]n light of Phillips, the burden of 
proof rests upon a defendant to demonstrate that unauthorized 
communications with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality. 
Prejudice is not to be presumed.”29 The Fifth and D.C. circuits 
have issued similar opinions.30 
 
C.  Letting Severity Dictate Application of the Remmer 
Presumption: First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
 
The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth circuits apply the 
presumption only if the juror’s misconduct is severe enough. In 
these circuits, courts may approach the misconduct with a 
presumption of prejudice only after assessing the extra-record 
material’s degree of relevance and type.31 The First Circuit’s 
27 See cases cited supra note 24. 
28 United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that “the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano”); 
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding 
there is no presumption, rather there is a weighing of the likelihood of 
prejudice); United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d. 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that “the defendant must prove that [the juror] was prejudiced thereby; prejudice 
is not presumed”).  
29 United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984). 
30 See cases cited supra note 28. 
31 United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
Third Circuit applies the Remmer “presumption of prejudice only when the 
extraneous information is of a considerably serious nature”); United States v. 
Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that only when the jury is 
actively influenced, or tampered with, by an extrinsic contact does the 
presumption of prejudice arise; “prosaic” contacts do not warrant a 
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opinion in United States v. Bradshaw illustrates this approach.32 In 
that case, the court maintained that, while the First Circuit still 
employs a Remmer presumption in some jury misconduct cases, 
that presumption did not apply when the jury came into contact 
with a magazine describing one of the attorneys in the case as that 
“of choice for ‘[e]very troubled mobster’ in Boston.”33 Despite the 
fact that this quote both suggested that the defendant was a 
mobster and undermined defense counsel’s credibility, the court 
did not grant the defendant the benefit of the Remmer presumption. 
In the court’s view, the extra-record material was just not nefarious 
or egregious enough to warrant such a presumption.34 Responding 
similarly, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth circuits apply the Remmer 
presumption only when the intruding material is of a certain, 
especially heinous type.35 
 
III.  A COMMON ANALYSIS 
 
Despite their differences, courts in each circuit engage in the 
same analysis when faced with jury misconduct. This analysis 
always addresses two basic questions: (1) what was the contact, 
and (2) what could its impact have been? To answer these 
questions, the circuit courts have created multi-factor rubrics that 
focus the court’s attention on the nature of the contact and the 
extent to which the jury appears to have relied upon it. Whether a 
particular circuit’s analysis is strictly limited to those two 
questions, calls for a looser list of factors that can ultimately be 
reduced to these questions, or implements a more formal list that 
can similarly be reduced, these are always the two basic questions. 
An example of the first, strictly-limited type of analysis comes 
from the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit has held that a court 
presumption); United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the Remmer presumption of prejudice only applies if the contacted 
material is extra-record factual evidence); United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 
230, 261 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the Remmer “presumption is applicable 
only where there is an egregious tampering” in “the jury process”). 
32 United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 287-88 (1st Cir. 2002). 
33 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting in part United States v. Boylan, 898   
F.2d 230, 258 n.17 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
34 Id. at 288. 
35 See cases cited supra note 31. 
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should determine what the extra-record material was and what the 
jury did with that material.36 The central focus of the analysis is 
the “what” and the “how.” The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth 
circuits engage in a similar analysis, requiring only a bifurcated 
assessment of the contact, its nature, and how its impression may 
have affected the jury; and the extent, magnitude, or gravity of the 
intrusion into the jury’s deliberation.37  
An illustration of the second type of analysis can be found in 
the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit has held that, although there is 
no explicit controlling list of factors, several factors found together 
suggest prejudice.38 The factors that the Third Circuit has 
considered include the relatedness of the contact to an element of 
the crime charged, whether the material referenced was within the 
generalized knowledge of the juror or jurors affected, the extent to 
which the juror shared his or her improper impression with other 
jurors, when the contact occurred during deliberations, and the 
efficacy of curative jury instructions.39 
A consideration of these several factors can be reduced to a 
single analysis of the material’s impact on the jury. The extent to 
which the jury may have been prejudiced by the improper contact 
will be greater if the contact was relevant to the crime charged, 
outside the scope of the juror’s generalized knowledge, impressed 
upon all of the jurors instead of just one, invaded deliberations 
right before the jury rendered its verdict, and was not addressed by 
the jury instructions. The number and strength of these factors in a 
given case influence whether the court believes that the contact 
was of such magnitude or gravity to justify setting aside a 
36 United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1985). 
37 See Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289 (explaining that the court must “assess the 
magnitude of the event and the extent of the resultant prejudice”); Blumeyer, 62 
F.3d at 1017 (holding that the contact was not prejudicial because of what it was 
and because of how it was used by the jury); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 
777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States ex. rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 
F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970)) (noting that the touchstone in the court’s 
assessment of the misconduct is “‘the nature of what has been infiltrated and the 
probability of prejudice’”); United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that the court, during the hearing, must asses the “likely 
extent and gravity of the prejudice generated by” the misconduct). 
38 Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 239. 
39 Id. at 239–41. 
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conviction. Essentially, this analysis is merely a re-articulation or a 
“breaking up” of the second central question: what was the likely 
impact of the contacted extra-record material on the jury? The 
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits also employ this type of 
analysis.40  
The Tenth Circuit provides the best example of the third type 
of analysis. In the oft-cited case Mayhue v. St. Francis Hospital of 
Wichita, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a list of 
five factors that determine prejudice in cases where the jury has 
come into unauthorized contact with a hard copy dictionary.41 
These five factors are (1) the centrality of the word to the case, (2) 
how the definition differs from the legal definition, (3) how the 
jury emphasized the definition, (4) the strength of the properly 
presented material and when the definition was introduced to the 
jury, and (5) any other factors.42  
Like with the Third Circuit’s rough list of factors, these five 
can be reduced to the second question noted supra—what was the 
impact of the contact on the jury? Once again, if the word or the 
contact is central to the resolution of the case, the material differs 
substantially from the material legally in front of the jury, the jury 
relied on the material for its decision, the authorized material in 
front of the jury is weak, and the jury came to its decision 
immediately after the contact, then the extent of prejudice created 
by the contact is greater than if one of these factors was not 
present. The list of factors is just an attempt to provide dimension 
to the extent analysis in which courts in all other circuits already 
engage. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits use a similarly formal list of 
40 See Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1300 (the factors a court can “consider include: 
(1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which the information 
reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner of 
the court’s inquiry into the juror issues, and (4) the strength of the government's 
case”); Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497 (maintaining that the court should 
consider “a range of factors,” including the nature, length, and impact of the 
contact); United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(maintaining that the factors “a court should look to in making this 
determination include the extent and nature of the unauthorized contact, the 
power of curative instructions, and the responses of the jury”).  
41 Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th 
Cir. 1992).  
42 Id. 
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factors.43 
IV.  ADDING THE ELEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Today, advances in technology have made it possible for an 
endless sea of electronically stored material to infiltrate jury 
deliberations. The Internet is a ready source of extra-record 
material and misconduct because unauthorized, potentially 
influential contact is just a few “clicks” away. The proliferation of 
Internet use during jury deliberations poses a challenging question 
to trial attorneys. Will unauthorized contact with the Internet 
change the core analysis discussed above? The Internet, a unique 
source of extra-record material, has the potential to affect the 
analysis because it is transient and much of its content is not 
subject to the integrity constraints of other media.  
The few cases in this area suggest that federal courts will not 
analyze Internet-based contacts differently than other contacts. 
Courts have applied the core analysis discussed above to cases 
involving general Internet research and Internet searches to define 
terms. This approach does not refer to the unique dangers posed by 
the Internet. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s primary focus in 
United States v. Lawson, a key case involving Wikipedia, was on 
other factors not specific to Wikipedia. Therefore, while the 
Lawson court suggested that Wikipedia as a specific source of 
material contributes to prejudice, practitioners should not expect 
any change to the core analysis. 
 
A.  General Internet Research 
 
When a juror comes into contact with unauthorized Internet 
research, circuit courts have appeared to pay little attention to the 
fact that the potentially prejudicial material was found on the 
Internet. In United States v. Lopez-Martinez, a juror compiled 
Internet research in an effort to be “as prepared as possible” for 
deliberations concerning a conspiracy to bring illegal aliens into 
43 See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 646 (applying the Mayhue factors); Marino v. 
Vasquez, 812 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing five factors when assessing 
jury misconduct including the length of time the material was available to the 
jurors and the extent to which it was discussed). 
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the country.44 Upon discovering that this research infiltrated the 
jury room on the first day of deliberations, the defendant moved 
for a new trial.45 The district court denied the motion without 
venturing into the content of the research or the fact that it was 
from the Internet. Rather, the district court’s denial relied on the 
fact that the vexatious juror had been dismissed following a mid-
deliberation hearing and the research had not reached the other 
jurors.46 The appellate court affirmed the denial.47 The trial court’s 
analysis of the extent to which jurors relied upon the extra-record 
material was sufficient even though it did not reach the actual 
content of the research or the fact that it was from the Internet. 
This analysis is well within the previously discussed traditional 
core analysis, as it focuses simply on the impact of the 
unauthorized contact. 
Likewise, in Moore v. American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company, a district court denied a defendant’s motion for a 
mistrial despite the fact that the jurors came into unauthorized 
contact with the defendant’s financial information.48 The jurors 
came into contact with this material via the Internet. Even though 
one juror said that the defendant “‘makes huge profits and can 
afford to pay[,]’” the defendant’s motion was denied.49 In so 
holding, the trial court said that there was no prejudice because the 
defendant’s ability to pay “was ‘not likely to be a major revelation’ 
to members of the jury.”50 The fact that the extra-record material 
came from the Internet was again irrelevant. The mere fact that the 
material was not outside the generalized knowledge of the jury was 
relevant. This concept is well within the traditional core analysis.  
In United States v. Farhane, a case where the court “considered 
the ‘nature’ of the extrinsic evidence[,]” or what the evidence was, 
the fact that the evidence was from the Internet was, yet again, 
irrelevant.51 In that case, a juror used Google to discover that a co-
44 United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 513, 517 (9th Cir. 2008). 
45 Id. at 517. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2009). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 169 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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defendant had pled guilty to “unspecified charges,” and the juror 
then told that fact to the other jurors.52 After analyzing the “nature” 
of the evidence, the trial court concluded, and the appellate court 
affirmed, that a mistrial was unnecessary.53 They held that the 
guilty plea was consistent with evidence presented at trial.54 The 
extent of the contact’s prejudicial impact was negligible or of such 
a magnitude not to warrant a new trial. The form of the material 
and vehicle by which the juror accesses the material are part of its 
“nature,” but the mere fact that its form was electronic and the 
vehicle was the Internet did not enter the court’s analysis. The 
Internet does not, in and of itself, establish grounds for a finding of 
prejudice. 
 
B.  Defining Terms 
 
When a juror conducts an Internet search specifically to define 
a term, courts follow the same core analysis. In United States v. 
Showa, an unpublished opinion, a juror looked up the term 
“telemarketing” online during deliberations.55 After questioning 
the juror who had done the research as well as the other jurors, all 
of whom said the definition was “general” or “insignificant,” the 
district court concluded that there was no prejudice warranting a 
new trial.56 The district court judge took the jurors’ testimony as 
reliable and stopped the inquiry. Since the jurors said the definition 
had little or no impact on their knowledge, the trial court found no 
prejudice. The court did not investigate the nature of the definition 
at all, and the appellate court affirmed without hesitation. 
Another case in which the outcome was not affected by 
Internet use was United States v. Bristol-Martir. In that case, a 
juror used the Internet to define legal terms, and the district court 
found no prejudice, but the appellate court did not affirm. The 
district court questioned the errant juror extensively and finally 
dismissed her after becoming aware that her position in the case 
52 Id. at 168. 
53 Id. at 169. 
54 Id. 
55 United States v. Showa, Nos. 96-50698, 97-50017, 1997 WL 801452, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1997). 
56 Id. 
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was based on her own research.57 However, the district court did 
not grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, stating that the 
“juror's research and subsequent statements to the other jurors did 
not taint the jury.”58  
The appellate court disagreed with this conclusion because the 
court neither questioned each juror independently as to whether he 
or she was influenced, nor attempted to cure any undue influence 
beyond making slight adjustments to the general jury 
instructions.59 Therefore, the judgment was vacated and the case 
was remanded for a new trial.60 Neither court’s analysis focused on 
the fact that the extra-record material came from the Internet or 
that the juror had used an Internet-sourced definition. The focus 
was on the extent to which each juror relied on the research and 
whether the court properly mitigated against this improper 
reliance. The district court and appellate court disagreed on the 
potential extent of the jury’s contact with the extrinsic evidence, 
but they did not disagree as to whether the Internet-based nature of 
the evidence was especially problematic. 
 
C.  Wikipedia-Based Jury Misconduct 
 
The only circuit court case that has tackled the issue of 
Wikipedia-based jury misconduct is United States v. Lawson.61 In 
this case, the district court and the circuit court applied the Mayhue 
factors in their attempt to decide whether or not a juror’s 
Wikipedia research on the definition of “sponsor”—a definition 
crucial to an element of the animal fighting offense charged62—
warranted a new trial.63 The trial court concluded that “there was 
no reasonable possibility that the external influence caused actual 
57 Id. at 36. 
58 Id. at 38. 
59 Id. at 43. 
60 Id. at 34. 
61 Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644–46 (stating that “such a situation is an issue of 
first impression in this Court” and that the court cannot point to other circuit 
court cases, despite its lengthy cross-circuit analysis, related to jury misconduct 
involving Wikipedia definitions). 
62 Id. at 636. 
63 Id. at 636, 646. 
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prejudice,” and denied the defendant’s motion.64 
On appeal the circuit court found that there were grounds for 
granting a new trial.65 The court’s decision hinged on how integral 
the term defined was to the crime charged, i.e., the first Mayhue 
factor; and the difference between the Wikipedia definition and the 
legal definition the court would have given if asked, i.e., the 
second Mayhue factor.66 Since the word “sponsor” was part of an 
element of a crime the defendant was charged with and the 
definition was at odds with its legal counterpart, the court vacated 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial.67  
The fact that the definition came from Wikipedia, a crowd-
moderated website featuring content that changes frequently, 
weighed in favor of remand as well.68 But that fact was not 
conclusive in and of itself.69 The Wikipedia factor was not one of 
the court’s central focuses. If anything, the court was unsure of 
how to weigh that fact.70 Moreover, the court’s use of the oft-cited 
Mayhue factors, born of misconduct involving a hard copy 
dictionary,71 further suggests that the court was not prepared to 
abandon the traditional, pre-Internet analysis. 
Therefore, the court’s consideration of the Wikipedia element 
is not a harbinger of change to the core misconduct analysis. To 
conclude that the Lawson court’s mere acknowledgement of 
Wikipedia’s uniqueness will make Wikipedia-based jury 
misconduct presumptively more prejudicial would be at odds with 
the forces behind the core analysis, which transcended the 
superficial circuit split. Such a view incorrectly characterizes 
Lawson as exceptional among other cases involving Internet 
research and defining terms, and misplaces the Fourth Circuit’s 
64 Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 Id. at 655. 
66 Id. at 646, 648, 655. 
67 Id. at 654–55. 
68 Id. at 650–51 (noting that the court is “troubled by Wikipedia’s lack of 
reliability”). 
69 Id. (explaining that the first Mayhue factor weighed “strongly in favor of 
[the defendant]” while the other factors were less significant). 
70 Id. (noting that “there remain many unresolved questions in this case due 
to the unreliability and ever-changing nature of Wikipedia”). 
71 See Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924. 
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The Internet, with its seductive speed, expansive accessibility, 
and countless sources of information, is an emerging source of 
problems for trial lawyers whose juries may succumb to its allure 
during trial. Yet this potential source of prejudice will meet the 
same misconduct analysis as every other juror contact with extra-
record material. Despite the circuit split over the proper application 
of the presumption of prejudice and the burden of showing the 
effect of extrinsic material, federal appellate courts tend to use a 
traditional undue influence rubric. The substantive nature and 
ultimate impact of the contact will be the court’s primary focus, 
rather than the medium by which the juror came into contact with 
the material. A prudent practitioner should base his or her 
argument on that core analysis as cases of Inernet-based, and 




 When preparing a motion for mistrial or a new trial, or a 
response to said motion, focus on the substantive nature of 
the extra-record contact and its ultimate prejudicial impact 
on the jury. 
 When assessing juror misconduct, do not waste too much 
time dealing with the presumption of prejudice, or lack 
thereof. Just research the language and framing of the 
analysis used in the circuit so as to best phrase the core 
argument. 
 Be diligent about jurors’ use of electronic devices during or 
outside of trial. 
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